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The Mythology of EU-wide Transfers - A Critique of David McKay and 
other 'Fiscal Federalists' I 
1. The EMU - a "high-pressure cooker without safety valve"? 
Many authors have claimed that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must 
be complemented with a system of financial transfers across the national borders. 
Otherwise it will not be sustainable. This way of reasoning can be found in many 
places in the academic world, and in many variations. A journalistic short-hand 
recently entered the Danish Press: Within a few years the Danes could expect an EU 
tax, on top of the existing tax burden, corresponding to 20 per cent of GDP? 
As far as I know, David McKay has presented the most elaborate version of this 
reasoning so far. In his view, the European Union became a proper federation with the 
Maastricht Treaty, and he then explores the question under which condition this 
federation could be sustainable. On the basis of much empirical evidence and 
sophisticated reasoning he concludes: "Ultimately, it will be the willingness of some 
states and regions to subsidize others and/or the extent to which mass publics will 
tolerate centrally induced welfare state retrenchments that will determine whether the 
union stands or falls".3 
Professor Sverker Gustavsson, of Stockholm, presented an even more dramatic 
version of this line of thought. To him, without a system of fiscal transfers among the 
1 This paper was presented to the annual conference of the DSE (Dansk Selskab for europaforsking -
Danish Society for European Research), 21" September 2000, in Copenhagen. I have to thank 
numerous colleagues, in particular Henrik Plaschke, for careful criticism. 
2 Berlingske Tidende, 13 th July 2000, p. 7. 
3 David McKay, Federalism and European Union. A Political Economy Perspective, Oxford 
University Press, 1999, p. 173. 
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EU member states, the EMU is a "high-pressure cooker without safety valve". 
Among four possible scenarios of the future development he discusses one, according 
to which democracy gets replaced by authoritarian regimes; democracy crumbles 
under the impact of the harsh conditions, imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP).4 
If this is the case, the matter is serious: None of the leading politicians seem to 
have been aware that they endangered democracy by signing the Maastricht Treaty and 
the SPG. And it is striking too: A key role during the preparations and negotiations for 
EMU was played by central bank presidents, central bank experts, and officials from 
the finance and economic ministries; i.e. highly-skilled people with daily contact to the 
real world problems of monetary and economic policy, and with privileged access to 
new data. In contrast to many of their academic colleagues, none of them seem to have 
seen the necessity of transfers. Not even by now, in 2000, do top politicians seem to be 
aware of the high pressure to increase transfers. In May 2000 the German foreign 
minister Joschka Fischer outlined an ambitious vision of future federal structures in 
Europe. But the question of transfers he did not address at all. Nor did Jacques Chirac, 
when presenting a similar vision to the Bundestag six weeks later.s And even more 
strange: At a time when numerous academics emphasize the necessity to increase 
transfers, the EU financial planning shows declining transfers. In 2000, the Structural 
and Cohesion Funds assign 32,045 million Euro (l999-prices), in 2006 only 29,170 
million.6 Is the European Union on a Titanic course? 
The aim of this paper is to make the reader relax. There is no danger of explosions, 
democracy is not at peril. For the foreseeable future, there will be comparatively few 
transfers across the borders of the member states, and this will not threaten the 
cohesion of the Union. Contrary to the above-mentioned positions, the low level of 
4 Sverker Gustavsson, 'Hvad g¢r en monetrer union, uden en parallel skatteunion, politisk holdbar?', 
Radet for Europreisk Politik, Danmark og @MU'en, Bd.I, Politiske aspekter, Aarhus, 2000, p. 60-93. 
"H¢jtrykskoger uden sikkerhedsventil", p. 75; scenario "autoritarisme", p. Blf. 
S See the text of the speeches, e.g. Frankforter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15th May 2000, p. 15, and 2Bth 
June 2000, p. IOf. 
6Europa-Kommissionen, Europas Agenda 2000. Pb vej mod et sliiJrre og stcerkere EU, BruxeIles, 
2000, p. 17. 
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transfers is even a necessary condition for the progress of European integration. But I 
have also to disappoint those federalists, who might think that the battle is already 
won. EMU will not automatically push the union to much more federalism. Those who 
want federalism have to work for it. If there will be substantial progress on the way to 
federalism (and presumably there will be), it will be due to completely different 
problems and mechanism. 
I certainly do not exclude any increase in the size of the EU budget. It is, for 
instance, likely that the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy will 
lead to a kind of European Defence Fund, out of which a common command structure, 
military infrastructure, air and naval bases, and the like will be financed. Also a kind of 
European FBI is conceivable, or a common police force to guard the borders, a kind of 
Bundesgrenzschutz. This way, some tasks will be transferred to the European level. 
The nations have to pay for it, but they also can reduce their own spending 
accordingly. So, the overall tax burden will not increase. And this kind of enlarging the 
EU budget has nothing to do with EMU, and it will hardly enlarge the transfers across 
borders. 
This does not imply that EMU will not create spill-over effects. Monetary experts 
or statisticians have to co-operate intensively, banking supervision needs a lot of 
common regulation, and already by now, countries with budget deficits are under a 
kind of moral pressure from the fiscally more virtuous ones. A better co-ordination of 
fiscal policy is likely (though it will not come automatically), and so is a better co-
ordination on the field of monetary diplomacy. EMU will presumably also have a very 
considerable cultural impact. Money is a strong symbol of mutual dependence, of co-
operation, of power, and it assists in structuring space and time. Not the least because 
of its symbolic impact, EMU has released so many high-energy emotions. When the 
Euro enters the private life of the European citizens, it will presumably shift mental 
borders and increase the feeling of European identity. EMU's likely spill-over effects 
will make a transition to more federalism more easy. But they do not build up a 
pressure for more federalism. It is not advisable to leave EMU as it is. But if the 
politicians wanted to do so, they could do so. 
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Part of the confusion stems from the fact that many scholars see the EU as a 
federation. But the EU should be studied as a construction sui generis. Analogies to 
the US and other federations can be misleading. 
2. Why transfers are necessary - allegedly 
Those who regard transfers among the EU member states as necessary for the 
survival of the union, have forwarded various lines of argumentation. One set of 
arguments is based on economic models of optimum currency areas.7 The argument 
runs, in short, as follows: A country is likely to be exposed to an "asymmetric" 
economic shock, which hits this country, but not the neighbouring one. Or at least, it 
hits one country harder than the neighbouring one. Such a shock could hit the supply 
side, e.g. an oil-price increase. On the demand side, a country might experience a 
sudden fall in export earnings, due to e.g. changing consumer preferences, and the like. 
Theoretically, such a shock could be absorbed in many ways: The country could resort 
to deficit spending, trying to stimulate its economy by a high level of public spending. 
Or it could devaluate its currency, thereby strengthen its competitiveness on the export 
markets. Competitiveness could also be strengthened by wage reductions. Or the 
unemployed people might move to other regions where there are better employment 
possibilities. But in a monetary union, a devaluation is excluded; and in the European 
countries, wages are rather inflexible, so wage reductions will hardly work. Further 
more, mobility across borders is low. And to make everything even worse: EMU 
countries are not allowed to run high fiscal deficits, so Keynesian demand stimulation 
is excluded. Conclusion: The shock will produce long-lasting misery and 
unemployment, which in turn creates massive political tensions. 
In the United States such a disaster cannot occur, because of the transfers. If one 
state is hit by a shock (e.g. Texas by falling oil-prices), money will automatically flow 
from Washington to Texas in the form of unemployment subsidies. At the same time, 
Texas will pay less taxes to Washington, and this results in a considerable net flow in 
Texas' favour. So, if the EU wants to avoid disaster, it has to establish a similar fiscal 
7 See, e.g. McKay, p. 142-146. 
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and transfer system. In federations, this comprises roughly 20 per cent of the GDP. 
So, we can expect a centralised EU fiscal system of about the same magnitude. 
A similar argumentation addresses the uneven effects of monetary policy: If the 
European Central Bank (ECB) rises interest rates, the various regions of the EU are 
affected quite differently. A rent rise might be perfectly justified for the Euro zone as a 
whole, but it could produce strongly negative effects in e.g. Portugal or Ireland. If we 
want to avoid massive political tensions, with the risk of the monetary union breaking 
apart, the negatively-hit countries must receive compensating transfers. 
A group of Euro-sceptic German economists drew attention to the social 
consequences of monetary integration in general: "With a common currency, the 
weaker members of the European Union will be exposed to greater competitive 
pressures, suffering growing levels of unemployment as a result of their lower 
productivity and competitiveness. Substantial transfer payments in the interest of 
financial equalization will therefore be necessary."g In this line of thought, economic 
integration, also in the absence of asymmetric shocks, produces social polarisation, 
which in turn makes transfers necessary, if we want to avoid unsustainable political 
tensions. Many political scientists seem to adhere to this kind of reasoning 
The high disparity of income levels in Europe is also at the centre of a more 
culturally-based argumentation: The common currency makes the income disparities 
more visible. High income disparities are, however, not compatible with a European 
identity. If the EU wants to keep its cultural, and thus also political cohesion intact, it 
must practice solidarity with its poorer members. 
This is an impressive row of arguments, drawn from a wide range of intellectual 
activity. But none of these arguments survives closer scrutiny. 
3. On asymmetric shocks, and shocking misunderstandings. 
The argument of asymmetric shocks, and the calamities produced by the 
impossibility of devaluation, is plausible at first glance. But it is hard to fill it with 
empirical substance. How could an external shock look like, which hits e.g. Denmark, 
8 As quoted in McKay, p. 149. 
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but not the others? It is not enough to find a shock scenario. The shock must be of a 
kind to produce a motive for devaluation . Of course, Danish bacon exports to the UK 
might collapse after the detection of a Mad Pig Virus, or the windmill industry might 
suffer a decline because Indian producers might learn to fabricate mills better and 
cheaper. But no Danish government would ever contemplate to devaluate the crown in 
such a case. A devaluation makes imported commodities more expensive, it is 
therefore the equivalent to an income reduction for the rest of the population - by far 
the majority in these cases. Furthermore, a devaluation would - overnight - destroy 
investors confidence in the stability of the crown. Denmark would have to face 
massive interest rises which would strangle huge parts of her economy. 
During the last two decades, all EU member states have worked hard to stabilise 
their currencies. After much sweat and tears they harvested the rewards in the form of 
low inflation and low long-term interests. And it is the long-term interests which are 
most important to growth and employment. No European government, regardless of its 
ideological stance, will put these achievements at risk, in order to please one branch 
(which, because of the adverse interest rate effects, in fact will not be pleased). 
Of course, one country might experience, not a particular shock, but a general 
recession, a downward phase of the business cycle. Under the conditions of closer 
economic integration within the EMU it is not very likely that the cycles will be very 
asynchronic. It can, however, not be excluded. Previously some countries devaluated 
their currency in such a situation. But also in this case, under the conditions of free 
capital movements, the country in question would be punished immediately by high 
long-term interest rates. So, EMU or not, no EU country would use this instrument. 
In the case of an economic downturn, the EMU member countries can instead use 
fiscal policy, i.e. practice a Keynesian policy of deficit spending, in order to prop up 
demand. It is a misunderstanding that the Stability and Growth Pact impedes this. Only 
deficits larger than three percent of GDP are forbidden. In the case of severe 
recessions, even this restriction falls. 
The fiscal position of the EU member states has improved dramatically during the 
last years. Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Sweden register budget 
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surpluses by now, and no country is at the bad side of minus two per cent. And alJ 
prognoses are good. Presumably already in 2002 no country will be placed worse 
than minus one per cent. 9 That means that already by then practically all member 
countries are safe. The OEeD has calculated that a budget deficit of between 1 and 1.5 
per cent gives a probability of 90 per cent that the budget deficit wiII keep clear of the 
3 per cent threshold, in case of a recession. This implies, of course, a remaining 10 per 
cent risk to hit the threshold. 10 If a government deems this risk as being to high, or if it 
in general finds it is too risky to build its policy on calculations of this kind, it might 
emulate the Nordic countries and produce budget surpluses. 
Against the option of deficit financing in order to stimulate demand, David McKay 
argues: " ... this option is limited in the longer term as capital markets downgrade the 
state's credit rating."!] Of course this option is limited. Does he imagine an economy 
experiencing a down turn, but going on for a long period producing the same old things 
as before, although demand is lacking, and at the same time keeping the earnings all 
the time at the same high level as before? And would such a behaviour qualify this 
country to transfers from other countries? Fortunately, periods with falling GDP are 
rather short and seldom. Between 1983 and 1999, most EU countries experienced a 
declining GDP only in one single year, 1993. Worst hit were Finland and Sweden, with 
a prolonged recession between 1991-1993, when both countries ran high fiscal deficits. 
Within a few years both transformed deficits into surplus, and by now they receive top 
ratings on the capital markets. 
In numerous articles and books the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact 
have been presented as inhuman, asocial, as an attack on the welfare state, and the like. 
To McKay the convergence criteria "looked like almost unattainable.,,]2 And in 
Sverker Gustavsson ' s eyes, the Stability and Growth Pact, if respected, implies a 
9 Giancarlo Corsetti and Paolo Pesenti, 'Stability, Asymmetry, and Discontinuity: The Launch of the 
European Monetary Union', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 1999, p. 295-372, esp. p. 354. 
10 Radel for Europreisk Pol ilik, Danmark og 0MU'en, Bind 2, 0konomiske aspekter, Aarhus, 2000, p. 
61. 
II McKay. p. 147. 
12 M K " cay. p. VII. 
11 
reduction in unemployment subsidies and reduction of welfare benefi ts. 13 This 
perspecti ve is erroneous. 
Firstly, to improve a countries budget position does usually not require cuts in the 
level of public sector spending. After the recession in 1993, the countries of the Euro 
area experienced substantial growth every year, usually well above 2 per cent. The 
projections for 2000 and 2001 predict 3.5 and 3.3 per cent respectively.14 In a growing 
economy, improving the budget balance means keeping the further increase of public 
sector spending temporarily a bit underneath the GDP growth rate. This fact seems to 
have been overlooked by many, so a simple model calculation might help. We assume 
a generous welfare state which spends half the GDP. The receipts, however, cover only 
46 per cent, which implies a budget deficit of 4 per cent. This is forbidden, according 
to the convergence criteria, and the SPG. We let the GDP grow by a modest 2 per cent 
a year. Then, restricting the rise in public spending to one per cent a year, will bring 
the deficit well below the threshold within 3 years: 
Table 1: Improving the budget position by raising expenditure. 
Year 1 2 3 4 
GDP 100.0 102.0 104.0 106.1 
Public spending 50.0 50.5 51.0 51.5 
Public receipts (46 46.0 46.9 47.8 48.8 
per cent of GDP) 
Budget deficit 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.7 
Deficit in percent 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.5 
ofGDP 
13 . 70 Gustavsson, op. CIt., p. . 
14 OECD, Economic Outlook, no. 67, Paris, June 2000, p. 245. 
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So, after three years of rising public expenditure, by one per cent a year, we are 
well below the threshold. A fourth year brings the deficit down to 2.0 per cent. It was 
exactly this mechanism which provided for the general improving of the budget 
balance in the EU member states. Restricting the growth of public spending often 
means temporarily cutting expenses in some sectors, in order to channel more money 
into high-priority areas . Temporary cuts in some sectors provoke, of course, resistance, 
and the media focuses upon them. So, they are usually difficult political issues. But 
unattainable? Destruction of the welfare state? Social burdens which threaten 
democracy? 
At the Intergovernmental Conference which led to the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Spanish, Portuguese, Greek and Irish delegations forwarded the idea of a Convergence 
Fund, to assist financially weaker countries (i.e. themselves) in meeting the 
convergence criteria. The proposal met the strong opposition of the German, British, 
French, and Luxembourg ministers. They feared that such a fund could dilute the 
criteria and weaken domestic efforts to meet them. At Maastricht, this question was 
solved as "essentially a symbolic side-payment for the Spanish, Portuguese, Greeks 
and Irish".15 Only as a minor ("symbolic") issue, mainly for the time of the transition 
to EMU, did the question of transfers enter the field of practical politics. 
The table above depicted a model of an ordinary case. An unusual case was 
Sweden. An extraordinarily severe recession with falling GDP figures for three years 
in a row created a public deficit corresponding to 12 (!) per cent of GDP in 1993. But 
also the recovery was extraordinary. The toughest years of the budget recovery are 
assembled in the following table: 
15 Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating Economic and 
Monetary Union, Oxford, 1999, p. 430 and 765. 
13 
Table 2: Budge! cOlISolidalion in Sweden, 1993-1996, SkI". million, currenl prices: 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
General 849736 887 179 950182 1040729 
government, 
cunent 
revenue 
Cunent 985485 1023272 I 058659 1069886 
expenditure 
Net lending -177 492 -158148 -128669 - 36483 
Per cent of -12.3 -10.3 -7.8 -2.2 
GDP 
Per cent, -7.0 -3.6 
Maastricht 
definition 
Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Sweden, 1997-98, Paris, 1998, p. 173. 
This was the toughest consolidation policy in Europe. The Social Democratic 
government, back in power in 1994, was clever enough to commit the necessary 
cruelties at the beginning of its tenD. If the figures above were adjusted for inflation 
(3.7 per cent in 1995), real public expenditure was actually falling from 1995 to 1996, 
and 1994-1995 meant a freeze in real terms. This could only be achieved by substantial 
cuts in many sectors in those years. But just in time, i.e. when the elections in 1999 
approached, the government could be generous again. And cunently, public 
expenditure if rising rapidly, and surplus is nevertheless above three per cent: The 
table above shows not the destruction of a welfare state, but its saving. 
Conversely, what are the effects, from a social point of view, if a government does 
not bring a deficit down, but leaves it at, say 4 per cent GDP? That means, public debt 
increases every year. Not only in absolute figures, but also in relation to GDP. This 
implies that interest payments occupy an ever growing share of the budget. Welfare 
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state function s must be res tricted, fi rst in relative terms, then in absolute terms, to 
make room for interest payments. Most European states made exactly this experience. 
In e.g. Denmark in 1986, government interest payments covered 16 per cent of the 
budget; in 1998, the figure was still at 9 per cent. If Denmark had not piled up a high 
burden in the 1970s and 1980s, she could double up the expenses for her public health 
service, right out of hand. 16 
The gigantic interest payments have implied a massive redistribution of income 
from wage earners to the owners of capital assets. Every state with barely a minimum 
of democratic functions intact, must stop this monstrousness sooner or later, whether 
they signed the SPG or not. Most European states embarked on this course already in 
the 1980s. Also the US have register budget surpluses the last years. 
It was not the main aim of the SPG to promote social justice. But as a side effect, 
by speeding up the process of budget consolidation, it did exactly this. 
To sum up, the provisions of the SPG and the loss of the possibility to devaluate, 
do not build up any pressure to establish a transfer system at the EU level. The nations 
can cope with recessions by using the budget as stabiliser. And to depict the SPG as an 
asocial monster attacking the welfare states and, by implication, qualifying a high-
deficit policy as social: That is almost Orwell language. 
4. Compensation/or a lower interest burden? 
Neither Maastricht nor the SPG contain any provision as to the size or construction 
of the welfare state. They just have to be financed properly, i.e. not by excessive 
deficits, a claim which all members now fulfil. In this context, no future burdens of any 
kind are to be expected from "Brussels" . The matter is, however, different as to the 
decisions of the ECB. It is indeed conceivable that e.g. a decision to rise interest rates 
can produce negative effects in some regions or countries. McKay must have had this 
case in mind, when he wrote: "Representatives from aggrieved countries (or regions of 
countries) will demand changes in EU policy including possibly assistance to help 
16 Wolfgang Zank, '0MU'en - el Vleffi irnod ornvedte Robin Hood'er' , Radel for Europleisk Polilik, 
Dan/nark og @mu 'en. Bd. 1. Politiske aspekteI', Aarhus, 2000, p. 252-270, esp. p. 264. 
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economJes adj ust. If conceded, these measures will have to be financed by an 
enhanced EU tax base ... " ,n 
Populist claims can, of course, not be excluded. But it can be excluded that they 
will be conceded. Firstly, the situation where European monetary decisions produce 
negative effects for member countries, is by no means new. In the 1980s and 19908, it 
was the Bundesbank to make monetary decision for Europe. Particularly in 1993, the 
German rent hikes - appropriate for the German situation - had devastating effects on 
Germany's neighbours. The dominance of the Bundesbank was one key motive for the 
creation of the EMU. Now, monetary decisions are taken on the basis of European 
considerations, all member states having a say. Compared with the situation before, 
this is an important improvement for all countries, except Germany. Given the point 
that transfers in practice mainly mean transfers from Germany to other countries: Shall 
Germany now pay because she gave up the Bundesbank? 
The transition to EMU has meant a dramatic improvement of the monetary 
conditions for most countries, in particular the Mediterranean ones. The nominal long-
term interest rates in e.g. Spain fell between 1989 and 1999 from 13.8 to 4.7 per cent. 
If we deduct inflation and calculate real interest rates, they fell from 6.7 to 1.6 per 
cent! 18 This is, of course, to great extent a result of the Spanish policy. But the 
elimination of any exchange rate risk for investors is a central factor too. 
For the period from 1994 onwards, the OECD figures allow for an overview about 
the development in Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (comparable figures for Greece 
are not available): 
17 McKay, p. 157. 
IS OEeD, op. cit, p. 279 and 258. 
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Table 3: Nominal and real long-terlll interests four Mediterranean countries and 
Ireland: 
1994 1999 
Nominal long-term 10.5 4.7 
interests, Italy 
Ireland 8.0 4.8 
Portugal lOA 4.8 
Spain 10.0 4,7 
Real long-term interest 7.0 3.2 
rates, Italy 
Ireland 6.3 0.8 
Portugal 4.1 2.2 
Spain 6.0 1.6 
Source: DECD, Economic OUllook, no. 67, Pans, June 2000, p. 279. Real interest rate: 
Nominal interest rate minus GDP deflator (ibid., p . 258). 
As we can see, all countries experienced an enormous relaxation of their monetary 
conditions, not the least due to the transition to EMU. Against this background, 
possible adverse effects of rises in the short-term interests administered by the ECB, 
are almost trivial. 
The concept of compensation claims against ECB decision rests on a 
misconception of the process of European integration. Every important integration step 
has entailed a broad package of decisions and effects. Each member state could accept 
such as package, if the perceived sum lolal of the effects for it was positive. German 
governments actively worked for EMU, because as a whole, they perceived it as being 
in Germany's interest. The loss of monetary autonomy, not just a pelitesse, was 
regarded as acceptable against this background. 
The Mediterranean governments worked hard for EMU membership. For some 
time, Italian politicians were seriously worried about the possibility that their country 
17 
might not be accepted. All leading Meditenanean politicians did not have the 
slightest doubt that EMU membership was in their interest, politically and 
particularly economically. Given the vast positive impact of the whole package, there 
is no basis for compensation claims against single ECB decisions . No leading 
politician will ever forward such a claim. 
5. The Spectre of Social Polarisation 
The idea that closer economic integration produces greater social polarisation, 
which in turn makes transfers necessary to maintain the cohesion of the EU, seems to 
have considerable appeal to many political scientists. But also as to this point, we may 
relax. 
The question whether closer economic integration produces polarisation, or on the 
contrary, is beneficial for all partners, has been the subject of debate for many decades. 
Several eminent economists have pointed at the danger that the fall of economic 
barriers might make the rich ones richer and the poor ones poorer. Probably best 
known in this context is Gunnar Myrdal's Economic Theory and Underdeveloped 
Regions, written in 1957. Myrdal worked with a concept of "circular and cumulative 
causations"; those can work in a beneficial way, but they can also push a region 
successively downwards. According to him, Southern Italy experienced this after the 
abolition of the tariff walls between North and South after unification in 1861. 19 Other 
authors emphasised the existence of "increasing returns to scale" (higher returns for 
investments in locations where already much capital has been invested), or special 
effects of geography which place lesser developed regions at a disadvantage. However, 
the majority of the economists, since the days of Adam Smith (1776) and David 
Ricardo (1817), have been insisting that closer economic integration, as a rule, is 
beneficial for both sides involved. Both sides gain because of the existing of absolute 
and comparative advantages, and the bigger market allows for further specialisation. 
Instead of polarisation we will witness gradual convergence on ever higher levels. The 
last many decades, this reasoning has been the intellectual underpinning for the 
19 Gunnar Myrdal, Okonomische Theorie und unterentwickelte Regionen, FrankfurtlM. 1974, p. 39. 
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advocates of free trade, liberalisation of capital movements, and the like. It is 
therefore somewhat ironic that the above quoted eurosceptic German economists, 
many of them neo-liberals of high profile, predicted a growing social polarisation as a 
consequence of EMU. Thereby they implicitly delivered intellectual ammunition to 
those who forward protectionist and interventionist claims. 
Currently, the vast majority of the economists seems to adhere to the position that 
negative cumulative effects or "increasing returns" cannot be excluded, but that they 
are unlikely in most cases. This is in particular valid for higher developed countries. 
We keep the particular problems of African or some East European countries outside 
our discussion and concentrate on Western Europe. We compare the Mediterranean EU 
members and Ireland with Switzerland. The indicator is GDP per capita, adjusted for 
Purchase Power Parities, from 1970 to 1997. 
Table 4: Mediterranean countries and Ireland, GDP per capita, purchase power 
parities, relative to Switzerland (=1 00), 1970, 1987, 1991, and 1997: 
1970 1987 1991 1997 
Greece 28.3 40.2 36.1 53.7 
Ireland 40.2 47.6 53.3 79.7 
Italy 58.6 77.4 77.9 82.1 
Portugal 30.0 39.7 42.6 59.0 
Spain 44.1 54.8 59.0 61.7 
Source: Calculated after the figures in OECD, National Accounts, as quoted in Statens 
offentliga utredninger 1993: 16, Nya villkor jor ekonomi och politik, Stockholm, 1993, 
p. 13 ; OECD Economic Surveys, Sweden, 1988/89, Basic statistics international 
comparisons; Economic Surveys, Spain , January 2000, Basic statistics, international 
comparison. 
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The picture is one of clear convergence, all five counuies are much closer to the 
Swiss level in 1997 than in 1970. In fact, apart from Greece between 1987 and 1991 , 
the table shows progress in convergence in any period. In our context, the convergence 
in the 1970s and 1980s is particular interesting because in those years the EU 
Structural Funds were non-existing, or of a lJifling magni tude. So they cannot have 
brought the convergence about. Furthermore, the figures for the time after 1997, 
including the projections for 2000 and 2001, show growth rates considerably above EU 
average for those countries. So, convergence goes on. Only Italy experiences currently 
growth rates which are positive, but below average20 
We also find convergence, albeit not so unambiguously, if we move from the 
international comparison to the disparities between the regions in one country. Among 
others, Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, in a very detailed study, analysed the 
economic disparities of the regions of seven European countries between 1950 and 
1985 relative to their national means, and between the US states from 1880 and 1988.21 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin found a remarkable similarity of slow, but steady 
convergence: The poorer regions grew faster than the richer ones, disparities became 
reduced. This is not valid for every year (e.g. the dispari ties between the British 
regions grew in the second half of 1970s), and a few regions actually fell back 
relatively to the national mean (the Auvergne, for instance). It is therefor possible to 
subdivide the period thereby modifying the picture; e.g. the 1980s saw only little 
convergence, partly even growing disparities, and this gives some room for debate. But 
for the period as a whole (1950-1990), convergence is the clearly dominating picture.22 
Contrary to widely held beliefs, that was also the case for the Italian South: In 1950, 
the GDP per capita in the four most prosperous regions of the North was 70 per cent 
above the national mean, in the seven regions of the South it was 32 below. In 1985 the 
20 OBCD, op. cit. , p. 245. 
21 Robert 1. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 'Convergence across States and Regions', Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, 111991, p. 107-182. 
22 See also their recent publication, with additional material (e.g. Japanese prefectures, etc.): Robert 
Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth, MIT press, Cambridge/Mass. and London, 1999. 
p.401. 
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figures were down to plus 38 in the North and minus 25 in the South 2 3 As to the US, 
they also calculated the importance of the transfers for the progress of convergence . 
Between 1880 and 1950, a period of considerable convergence, they were completely 
negligible. In the following decades they were of very limited importance.24 
In the progress of European integration, not one country or region has become 
poorer. There are afew cases of relative decline in relation to the national average. But 
the general picture is growth above national average for the poorer regions, and the 
national averages themselves have been clearly converging. Here we have another 
explanation why most politicians in the Mediterranean countries have been strongly 
pro-Europe and pro-EMU. 
To sum this point up: The dynamics of regional development do not support the 
idea that transfers will be necessary in order to avoid a growing polarisation. 
6. Inequality and transfers. 
Sometimes the mere existence of economic disparities is forwarded as an argument 
for the necessity of transfers. The European Union has to organise practical solidarity 
with its poorer regions, otherwise, again, the stability of the Union is at jeopardy. 
But we can, again just dryly state that the assignments to the Cohesion and 
Structural Funds are decreasing, at least until 2006. No top politician seems to see any 
necessity to enlarge them. Certainly, it would be nice if the richer countries sent more 
money to the poorer regions. But obviously, they are not so nice. 
Also the position that inequality makes transfers necessary, rests on a 
misunderstanding of the process of European Integration. Integration has been possible 
so far on the bas is that all partners involved could see that a new step towards 
integration brought net advantages to everyone. Substantial transfers, just because 
some are poorer than others, will not entail advantages for all the parties involved. The 
better-off countries would loose. So, they will not agree. 
23 Barro and Sala-i-Martin , 1991, p. 150. 
24 Ibid., p. 122. 
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At present , as McKay documents very thoroughly,2S every survey shows that 
most ci ti zens of the ED member states regard themselves primarily as members of a 
national community. Europe comes second. This means that substantial transfers to 
other member states in the name of solidarity, would provoke populist revolts, whose 
militants would claim that the poor in the own country should have priority over people 
in other countries. As the Italian experience (Lega Nord) shows, transfers to other 
regions can even create populist revolts inside a nation state. Mentalities being as they 
are by now, and properly being so in the foreseeable future, substantial transfers at the 
ED level would create many Leghe Nord. 
And how could poorer countries legitimate claims for more transfers? No member 
country was forced to join the ED or the EMU. All did so voluntarily. And in particular 
the countries of the EU periphery - with very good reasons (see above) worked hard to 
become EMU members. Countries such as Germany and Holland were reluctant to 
accept Italy and other Mediten'anean countries as EMU members. In the end, they were 
so moved by their pleadings that they gave in. And now they should pay? Here perhaps 
an analogy from private life is appropriate: When you are accepted as a member of a 
club, it is not cricket to demand money from the others. 
How is the often-heard argument to be understood that there will be "tensions" 
inside the EMU, unless there are substantial transfers? Will e .g. Greece threaten to 
leave EMU? Greece would hit herself severely, but hardly the others. Of course, 
Greece (or other countries) could threaten to veto further integration in the fields where 
unanimity is still required. But how effective will it be, to use a veto in order to 
blackmail the others? Blackmailers effectively isolate themselves, while the others will 
go on. We can safely suppose that top politicians are clever enough to anticipate the 
immediate consequences of attempted black-mail. So, there will be no tensions. 
7. Con eluding remarks. 
The transition to the EMU was an important step in the process of European 
Integration. Before EMU, the EU member countries experienced divergent inflation 
25 McKay, p. 162-172. 
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rates, divergent and rather high interes t rates, and consequently exchange rate 
volatility; the dominance of the Bundesbank created distortions for many countries, 
severe political tensions were the result. In 2000, inflation rates and long-term interests 
are low everywhere, the exchange rate volatili ty among the member states is 
eliminated, and so are the political tensions which were caused by the Bundesbank 
dominance. So, contrary to McKay's, let alone Gustavsson's position, EMU did not 
create tensions, it removed them. The EMU will produce spill-over effects, political 
and cultural ones. But they alone wi ll not push the EU on the way to federalism. The 
architects of EMU constructed in a way that it could be a Stand-Alone-Project. And 
certainly did EMU not create a need for substantial transfers . 
The history of the US is a fascinating subject. But it should not lead us to think in 
crude analogies. The factors which produced fiscal centralisation there, might be 
absent in Europe. The EU is best studied as a construction sui generis. And if we want 
to get an idea, in which direction the development might go, we can start with actual 
factual developments. 
The EU is currently filling the project of a Common Foreign and Defence Policy 
with substance. The apparent risks of a potentially unstable political environment in 
e.g. Southeaster Europe, were a major factor to bring this development about. But it 
has nothing to do with EMU. 
Another major problem is the Eastern Enlargement. Also the Eastern Enlargement 
has nothing to do with EMU. The prospect of enlargement was a catalyst for renewed 
efforts to reform the EU's institutional set-up. An important part of the on-going 
negotiations is exactly the necessity to reduce the automatic transfers, mainly those via 
the Common Agricultural Policy. If there is one certain method to block the 
enlargement, it is presumably the construction of new automatic transfer mechanisms. 
Then the resistance in many member countries against enlargement will considerably 
stiffen. As was high-lighted by EU commissioner Gi.inther Verheugen's proposal to 
organise a German referendum on the question of Eastern enlargement, large sections 
of the population in Germany (and in other countries) are not convinced that the 
enlargement is in their interest. The main problem is presumably the (probably 
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enoneous) idea that the result would be a mass immigration into the wealthier EU 
countries. Agains t th is background, what would be the popular reaction if the EU top 
politicians installed new automatic transfer mechanism, not only to the Meditenanean 
countries, but also to Eastern Europe? 
So, it is not the absence, but the creation of transfers which would create tensions, 
burden the cohesion of the Union considerably, and block the enlargement. 
But, again, we can relax: New automatic transfers are not on the agenda. 
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